A short memo about Windows Server 2008/SBS 2008 compatibility: as the ORF Administration Tool requires administrator privileges to run, it must be ran as administrator. The easiest way to archive this is to update the Admin Tool shortcut with setting the “Run as Administrator” checkbox. Without elevation, you may not be able to start/stop the ORF Service from the Admin Tool and also statistics will not be available. The upcoming ORF 5 version will be shipped with a manifest that will cause Windows to automatically prompt for elevation.
ORF Web Reports (Technology Demo)
Just in case you missed it: we have released a technology demo for the ORF OLE DB Log Provider, called the Web Reports. The demo imports your ORF logs into a Microsoft® SQL Server database and provides a web page where your users can review their blacklisted emails. Full source code is available.
There are two interesting points in the demo. First, it features a Windows Service (written in C#) that polls ORF log files for changes. This component can be used to have your logs in MSSQL, almost real-time. Second, the web page component (ASP.NET/C#) uses Integrated Authentication to identify the user, dig his/her email addresses Active Directory™ and display only the relevant entries from the log database. This authentication method works automatically on the intraweb, so your user is not prompted for a password.
As this is a technology demo as opposed to a full-featured product, there are many ways to improve it, from better database scheme normalization to visual design and features, but is serves as a solid basis to develop your own, custom-tailored end-user information system.
Nerd.dk Blacklist Generator
This online tool allows you to blacklist emails based on their source country, by generating an ORF DNS Blacklist definition for the countries.nerd.dk IP-to-country DNS blacklist.
Check out the new Countries.nerd.dk Definition Generator tool on our website.
New: Backscatter Protection Agent
This new External Agent (download from here) can help with reducing the damages of “backscatter”, a phenomenon that occurs when a spammers sends forged emails in the name of your domain. Given a sufficiently large amount of forged emails, some of these will be undeliverable, resulting in tons of Delivery Status Notifications (DSNs) flooding your servers. As the DSNs are coming from otherwise legitimate servers, IP-based filtering is no big help here and neither the other tools of ORF, except this new one.
The idea behind the agent is that most DSNs contain the original email and this allows the agent to check if the original email is from your network, by examining whether it shows properties unique to your network.
This agent checks specifically for the Message-ID email header, which has a unique format pattern for every network/server. The agent extracts the Message-ID headers from the bounce report, and matches them with your unique pattern. If none of the Message-IDs are like your pattern, the agent reports that the original email was probably from another network—in other words, it’s a backscatter DSN.
Note that this concept of backscatter detection has not been tested in production enviroments and due to this, we call the agent “experimental”. Finding every Message-ID pattern for your email infrastructure can be quite a challenge, depending on how heterogeneous your network is. This is because the Message-ID may be generated by either the email client (MUA) or the email server (MTA). Neither Outlook, nor Outlook Express generate a Message-ID on their own, but Mozilla Thunderbird does. Without knowing what email clients are used in your network and how they behave, you cannot reliably tell your Message-ID patterns. For example, ISPs have no chance to use this agent.
Despite this limited use, we think the agent may be useful for many smaller networks. Also, there are several ways how we can improve the original idea, for example, by recording the Message-IDs of all outgoing emails in a database or by checking other email properties, but these solutions come at a higher cost—let us know if the agent does not work for your and why, so that we can improve it to cover your requirements.
Backscatter Considerations
In this post, I would like to talk about an underdesirable effect of rejecting emails at On Arrival—one that may cause your network to take part in abusing innocent servers, called “backscattering”.
Let’s assume you have a front-end SMTP server in the DMZ and an Exchange server on the private intranet. ORF is running on the Exchange server, configured to reject emails. What is going to happen with incoming spam in this setup? The front-end will receive the spam and relay it to the Exchange server. ORF will blacklist and reject the spam during the transmission. The front-end server, encountering the transmission error, will generate Non-Delivery Report (NDR) and return it to the original email sender. Perfectly how the RFC requires.
What’s wrong with this? It’s that the sender is always forged. The NDR will be sent to a perfectly innocent domain that is not involved in the spam attack anyhow. Actually, this is how we got into the anti-spam business in the first place—a spammer forging our domain name forced us to write our first extension to IIS SMTP for disabling a specific recipient.
Help the fellow admins: if you run ORF behind a front-end SMTP server and can’t move ORF to the DMZ, consider changing the On Arrival action to tagging or redirecting.
